First, let’s get the preposition right. All commentary regarding entering the Cuban market makes reference to investing “in” Cuba. But, when used as a preposition, “in” innocently indicates inclusion within a space or place.
However, “in” is an insufficient and misleading preposition with reference to Cuban investments. Investing “in” Cuba is a naive expression that closes the eyes to the “with” character of those investments.
The island is not like other foreign markets where the investor’s due diligence requires mostly investigating demographics, local market information, and maybe some political risks.
Cuba is a totalitarian state. Investing in Cuba necessarily requires investing in partnership with the Cuban government, and more specifically with the Cuban military.
It is thus much more precise to use the preposition “with”’ to denote “accompanied by.” Investing with Cuba, in association with the Cuban military, requires a much more rigorous due diligence.
Investing “in” Cuba requires the investor to contend only with factors such as median income of US$20 per month, outdated internet, communication and information systems, an unfriendly business environment, violation of workers’ rights, widespread corruption, unreliable energy, outdated water and sewer systems, a crumbling infrastructure, a bankrupt economy, an awkward dual currency system, and much more.
In addition, investing “with” Cuba requires foreign firms to accept being minority partners, with the Cuban government representing the controlling shareholder.
Under this arrangement, the Cuban government expects foreign investments to generate revenues for the state on its terms. If the venture fails to meet the expectations of the state, it may arbitrarily terminate the agreement, and there is no independent judicial system to adjudicate any investor claims.
It is also a mischaracterization to speak of a “private sector” in Cuba with the suggestion that such a sector exists as possible partners for US investors. There is no private sector in Cuba in the sense that we use that term in free-market economies.
The so-called self-employed (cuentapropistas) in Cuba are not equivalent to a private sector. These are individuals whom the state has granted permission to operate in one of 201 highly specified domestic trade activities and under very restricted conditions.
They do not have legal standing as would a sole proprietorship, partnership, or corporation in the United States. It is therefore very misleading to speak of a private sector in Cuba.
Let’s take just one aspect of doing business “with” Cuba to illustrate how it offends our values and morality, our labor and business laws, and our expectations of corporate behavior.
Foreign investors operating on the island cannot hire their own employees. The foreign firm must negotiate with the Labor Ministry a “contract for the supply of its labor force,” indicating the quantity and qualifications of needed employees.
The state staffing agency for foreign enterprises then sends its pre-screened personnel to the foreign firm. The foreign employer pays directly to the staffing agency in foreign currency, or equivalent Cuban convertible pesos (CUC). The staffing agency then pays Cuban workers in non-convertible national Cuban pesos (CUP).
Under this arrangement, the state pockets over 90 percent of the worker’s purported salaries.
This practice is a form of slavery that violates International Labor Organization conventions. Cuban writer Carlos Alberto Montaner has aptly named it: Cuba, the pimp state. It is a repugnant practice that would expose participating US companies to public scorn and endless litigation.
Corruption is a serious problem in official Cuba, with an ethos of unlawfulness, and a state-controlled economy where there is little respect for the rule of law. US companies, particularly publicly traded firms subject to myriad anti-corruption and disclosure regulations, would find it nearly impossible to operate lawfully in such an environment of systemic and endemic corruption.
Those looking to invest “with” Cuba should therefore include in their due diligence the vetting of their to-be controlling shareholder: a state-owned enterprise such as GAESA, the vast conglomerate run by Brigadier General Luis Alberto Rodríguez López-Calleja, Raúl Castro’s son-in-law.
And we should all begin using the preposition “with” to specify that it’s not investing “in” Cuba, but in partnership with the corrupt Cuban military.
EspañolColombia's Central Bank set its inflation target for 2015 at 3 percent, but the year closed with inflation levels of 6.77 percent. This is the highest inflation level registered since 2008. This has hit poorer Colombians the hardest since the price of food increased by 7.26 percent, with a consumer price index (CPI) of 10.85 percent. The Colombian state is blaming inflation on the weather and El Niño. According to the National Statistics Department (Dane), the cost of vegetables increased 41.53 percent, while fruit prices rose 24.78 percent and potato and plantain prices increased 17.46 percent. Others point to the growing devaluation of the Colombian peso against the US dollar as a main source of inflation. This is related to the rapidly decreasing price of oil, which was Colombia's main export during the past year. José Darío Uribe, head of the Colombian Central Bank, said on January 6 that devaluation has affected "imported goods, including basic foodstuffs." He also predicted that inflation would decrease during the second semester of 2016. [adrotate group="8"] The Central Bank also stated that it will continue to raise interest rates in order to stabilize inflation, a process that will take at least two years. Luis Guillermo Vélez, economics professor at Medellín's Eafit university, said that the Central Bank should have raised interest rates sooner last year in order to counter inflation. "It's true that nobody has a crystal ball that predicts the future accurately," he told the PanAm Post, "but monetary contraction could have been applied sooner." Nonetheless, he stated that the Central Bank "has responded properly to the situation, which is worrying but controllable within 18 months as long as the bank resists external pressure." Colombian Economy Set to Grow at 3% According to the United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Cepal), the Colombian economy is set to grow by 3 percent in 2016. And Colombia's National Association of Businessmen (ANDI) anticipates that foreign investment and free trade agreements can help the economy. They also think that public works can lead to growth and employment. Still, the ANDI mentioned low global growth — particularly in China, Russia, Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina — as a factor that could further slow down the Colombian economy. Low oil prices, moreover, can continue to hurt the Colombian hydrocarbon industry, which could lead to falling tax revenues. Financial consultant Jorge Eduardo Castro states that this can be countered by strengthening the non-oil sectors of the Colombian economy. Translated by Daniel Raisbeck.